We evaluate the e¤ects of a fundamental lever of constitutional design: the duration of public o¢ ce terms. We present a simple model grounded in interviews with legislators and highlight three forces shaping incentives to exert legislative e¤ort. We exploit two natural experiments in the Argentine Congress (where term lengths were assigned randomly) to ascertain which forces are empirically dominant. Results for separate measures as well as an aggregate index of legislative e¤ort show that longer terms increase e¤ort. Shorter terms appear to discourage e¤ort not due to campaign distractions but due to an investment payback logic: when e¤ort yields returns over multiple periods, longer terms yield a higher chance of capturing those returns. A broader implication is that job stability may promote e¤ort despite making individuals less accountable. 
Introduction
A fundamental question in constitutional design is how long public o¢ cials should serve before they can be replaced. One advantage to keeping terms short is that more frequent accountability should allow tighter control over political agents and reduce shirking. Barro (1973, p. 30 ) makes this point in the context of electoral discipline. But, as we highlight in a simple model, a high frequency of elections may distract o¢ cials from their duties and also discourage e¤ort that takes time to yield results. What forces dominate the incentives facing politicians?
We answer this empirical question by exploiting two natural experiments in the Argentine legislature; in both instances politicians were assigned di¤erent term lengths through a well-documented randomized procedure. The …rst case involves the Argentine House of Representatives in 1983, when 254 House members were randomly assigned to two-or four-year terms; the second case involves the Argentine Senate in 2001, where a constitutional reform led to the random allocation of 71 senators to terms lasting two, four, or six years.
We …rst analyze the case of the House of Representatives in 1983, for which we have more observations and more measures of e¤ort (to be detailed shortly). We compare the level of legislative e¤ort of the two-year legislators to that of their four-year counterparts. We do this for the …rst two years of legislative activity, while both groups worked side by side. Our …rst step is to study e¤ects on an aggregate index constructed on the z-scores of individual measures of legislative e¤ort (see Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007) , and then study e¤ects on individual measures. We also consider an alternative aggregate measure, namely the …rst principal component of the individual e¤ort measures. We …nd a signi…cant positive e¤ect of a longer term on the e¤ort index, the principal component measure, and on four of the six individual measures. Our study of the Senate shows a similar pattern.
The six individual measures of e¤ort that we obtained are attendance to ‡oor sessions, participation in ‡oor debates (measured by number of speeches), committee activity (attendance to committee sessions and participation in the production of committee bills), the number of bills each member introduced, and how many of these were approved. 1 1 Some of these measures have been used in the context of American politics (e.g., Schiller 1995, and 2 According to our theoretical model incentives to perform are stronger in a shorter term as the "carrot"of reelection lies closer in time (an accountability e¤ect). But the model also highlights two forces operating in the opposite direction. First, if campaigning commitments clash with legislative duties, a shorter term may lower legislative e¤ort (a campaigning effect). Second, if legislative e¤ort yields rewards that accrue over time, a shorter term lowers expectations of reaping those rewards, again discouraging e¤ort (a payback horizon e¤ect).
Our …rst set of empirical …ndings suggest that the accountability e¤ect is overriden by the campaigning or the payback horizon e¤ects (or both). The size of the e¤ects is substantial.
For example, longer terms increase bill submissions by senators by almost 50 percent, and they almost double the number of bills by representatives that get approved. Longer terms might be a cost-e¤ective way to promote legislative productivity: Ferraz and Finan (2008) estimate that it takes a 20 percent increase in wages to local Brazilian legislators to increase the number of bills submitted by 25 percent and the number of bills approved by 22 percent. Our next step is to investigate the presence of the campaigning and/or the payback horizon e¤ects by taking to the data further implications of the theory. We compare the e¤ort of senators who were dealt terms of four versus six years, while restricting attention to the …rst two years of their terms, when campaigning commitments are absent. Under the campaigning hypothesis we should …nd no e¤ort di¤erential across legislators, but under the payback scenario we should. We …nd that the senators in the six-year track display stronger e¤ort, suggesting that the payback horizon matters. In a similar vein, under the campaigning hypothesis the e¤ort de…cit of short term House members should be smaller in the …rst year, when campaigning commitments are a long time away. We …nd no such evidence. An additional implication of our model is that if campaigning drives the e¤ects of term length, then these e¤ects should be stronger among legislators representing geographically remote districts (those legislators face a stronger con ‡ict between campaigning and legislating).
We again fail to …nd empirical support for the campaigning hypothesis. Under the null of no campaigning-driven e¤ects, our model predicts that in the presence of payback e¤ects legislators who are electorally safer should be less sensitive to term length than legislators Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson 1983). at risk. The data support this prediction. Our …nal empirical exercise shows that the e¤ects of term length do not seem to vary with experience.
Our results underscore the fact that the advantages of more frequent instances of accountability may be reversed by other forces. Job stability could pay when returns to e¤ort accrue over time: e¤ort resembles an investment and a longer guaranteed tenure allows further payback. The legislators we interviewed rated this explanation as highly plausible.
The empirical investigation of the e¤ects of term length faces several identi…cation challenges that are overcome by our study. Consider for example the substantial cross-country variation in the length of legislative terms (see Table 1 ). This variation, one may think, could help identify the e¤ects of term length on legislative e¤ort. However, term length may be endogenous to di¤erent incentive trade-o¤s, hindering identi…cation.
An alternative approach would be to focus on a single legislature with staggered terms and compare the behavior of legislators facing reelection at di¤erent points in the future.
Amacher and Boyes (1978) followed this approach focusing on the 93rd Congress of the United States. They found that senators closer to reelection voted more in line with House representatives (who presumably proxy for constituency interests). Kalt and Zupan (1990) studied the e¤ects of election proximity for senators in the 95th Congress without …nding a strong e¤ect. Thomas (1985) tracked the voting pattern of senators in their third versus their sixth year between 1959 and 1976, …nding a moderating tendency of election proximity. Lott and Davis (1992) provide further references in this area. Their discussion emphasizes that most of the papers attempting to identify the e¤ects of electoral proximity focused on voting patterns and su¤ered from measurement and speci…cation problems.
2 Closer to our focus on shirking, Lott (1987) estimated a negative association between retirement (itself an endogenous variable) and the frequency of voting. The closest work to ours is a recent paper by Titiunik (2008) who analyses the impact of a random assigment of term lengths in the 2 Lott and Davis (1992) reexamine data for United States senators and …nd that the proximity of elections does not signi…cantly a¤ect voting behavior in the United States Senate. The general consensus in the profession since then has converged on the idea that voting patterns in the Congress of the United States are largely independent from electoral pressure (see Poole and Rosenthal 1997 and Lee, Moretti, and Butler 2004 Some of the main problems in the existing literature relate to endogeneity as well as confounding the e¤ect of a shrinking term length with time e¤ects, tenure e¤ects, or cohort e¤ects. 3 The ideal setting would allow to observe legislators elected at the same time, who di¤er only in the term length they are assigned. Our study o¤ers that possibility.
We analyzed two di¤erent natural experiments involving two di¤erent chambers at two di¤erent points in time, …nding similar patterns and partly addressing issues of external validity. But much remains to be done to understand comprehensively the e¤ects of term length. One limitation of our study is it cannot say at what length-8, 10 or more yearsfurther term extensions will discourage e¤ort. Also, term lengths may have di¤erent e¤ects in di¤erent countries. Our study only covers one country, under a proportional representation system, and does not address the important issue of the quality of policy. Lastly, natural experiments-including ours-still face challenges in terms of the exogeneity and nature of treatment. An important threat to identi…cation relates to e¤ects arising from the lottery per se, be them psychological or organizational in nature. Fortunately, various features of our data help allay some of these reservations.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present a simple theoretical model to frame the empirical investigation, and then situate the model and the e¤ects it highlights in the context of the literature on contracts. In Section 3 we describe the natural experiment in the House and present the data. In Section 4 we lay out the econometric approach, report the main results from the House, and discuss threats to identi…cation and robustness. In Section 5 we present data and additional evidence from the Senate. In Section 6 we investigate possible mechanisms behind the e¤ects of term length. Section 7 concludes.
3 Crain and Tollison (1977) consider governorships as investment projects and compare campaign expenditures across races for two versus four year positions. They …nd that campaign expenditures are larger for a four year governorship than for two races for a two year governorship. The main potential confounding factors here are state e¤ects, and the possibility that di¤erent term lengths may attract di¤erent candidates and di¤erent campaign contributions.
2 The model
As mentioned earlier, the classic model by Barro (1973) yields the prediction that more frequent elections induce less shirking (see also Ferejohn 1986 and Schultz 2008) . We postulate a very simple model of legislative e¤ort that is better suited to match the structure of our data and captures other e¤ects. A more detailed discussion of the connections between our model and the literature on incentives in general, and on contract length in particular, is deferred to the end of this section.
We consider two classes of legislators: Short term legislators face reelection after one period, and long term legislators face reelection after two periods. After the …rst reelection both types of legislator have two period terms (matching our House study) so their prospects contingent on being reelected are identical and have value V . 4 Our exposition abstracts from dynamic programming aspects to focus on the (empirically observed) …rst period e¤ort choices.
Legislators choose legislative e¤ort l upfront in their term and face a quadratic cost l 2 .
Legislators must also exert campaigning e¤ort. There is a basic campaigning e¤ort made by the party on behalf of each legislator facing reelection. This implies that legislators exert some campaigning e¤ort even when they are not up for reelection, simply because they must collaborate with the party e¤ort on behalf of those who are. That basic level is normalized to zero. In addition, legislators facing reelection at the end of a period may face an extra, individual, campaign e¤ort outlay c , at a quadratic cost c 2 . However, if the term is short, legislative and campaigning e¤ort must be deployed in the same period, creating an extra cost (l + c) due to agenda congestion. 5 In keeping with the legislative sources we interviewed the cost of simultaneously engaging in the two activities increases with the distance 0 between the capital and the legislator's province. The parameter 2 f0; 1g ; tracks the presence of individual campaigning: when = 0 campaigning is purely a team e¤ort, and when = 1 those facing reelection meet extra campaign commitments. 4 Once our model is fully speci…ed it becomes obvious that V > 0. 5 A multiplicative formulation for the congestion costs is perhaps more natural. It yields similar results but imposes a heavier notational burden.
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The legislative and campaigning e¤orts a¤ect a legislator's probability of reelection P (l; c; ) = p (l; c; ) 2 [0; 1), which depends on a scalar parameter 0 and an electoral safety shifter . We will typically obviate this latter argument to save on notation. The function p (l; c) satis…es p l 0; p c 0; p ll 0; p cc 0; p lc 0; p > 0. In other words, we assume weakly decreasing marginal returns, and weak complementarity between the two forms of e¤ort.
Each unit of legislative e¤ort yields a stream of unitary returns beginning in the current calendar period in the form of recognition, policy achievements, or legacy. If h = 0 we say the payback horizon is short because e¤ort yields only a unit return in the current period.
If h = 1; we say the horizon is long because the stream of returns lasts for two periods (the stream under this long horizon can be made arbitrarily long at some extra notational burden). In this case legislative e¤ort embodies an investment, and its returns can also be interpreted as generating a lower cost of being active in the next period, as when learning by doing takes place. Assuming legislators earn wages w per term, the respective programs for long and short term legislators are,
where subscripts L; S denote respectively long and short term legislators.These expressions capture the main ingredients of the model. Short term legislators face reelection sooner, so the rewards from being reelected are discounted less heavily; but they also face higher costs from simultaneous legislating and campaigning, and when the stream of legislative returns is long they need to be reelected before they can capture the entire stream.
6 This appears reasonable. If there is any interaction between the two forms of e¤ort, it is more likely that campaigning might help reelection chances if the legislator has good things to communicate about his legislative record.
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The …rst order conditions are,
with complementary slackness
with complementary slackness.
In order to isolate the e¤ects of interest we characterize the solution under alternative parametric scenarios in the following, Proposition 1 i) (Accountability) If there is no role for individual campaigning ( = 0), the returns to legislative e¤ort are instantaneous (h = 0), and the more distant future is discounted more heavily ( 2 (0; 1)), then short term legislators exert more legislative e¤ort than long term legislators.
ii-a) (Campaigning) If the returns to legislative e¤ort are instantaneous (h = 0) but there is a role for individual campaigning ( = 1) and the discount rate is either high or low enough, then long term legislators exert more e¤ort than short term legislators.
ii-b) (Payback) If there is no role for individual campaigning ( = 0), the returns to legislative e¤ort extend into the future (h = 1), reelection is less than fully certain and the marginal e¤ect of legislative e¤ort on reelection chances is low enough ( is low enough), then long term legislators exert more e¤ort than short term legislators.
Proof. The assumptions made on the cost and reelection probability functions guarantee that l S ; l L > 0 in all scenarios.
i) Under = 0 there is no role for individual campaigning, so c S = c L = 0; given h = 0 the …rst order conditions for l are 2l L + 1 + 2 P l (l L ; c 0 ) V = 0 for long term legislators and 2l S + 1 + P l (l S ; c 0 ) V = 0 for short term legislators. The extra discounting in the former
, and 7 The second order conditions are straightforward and require that the sensitivity of reelection and the complementarity between c and l not be too high.
Note that for close enough to 0 or 1 discounting is the same for both types of legislator. The only di¤erence in the …rst order conditions is the higher marginal cost facing short term legislators. Thus, as long as is close enough to 0 or 1 weak complementarity becomes a su¢ cient condition for l S < l L .
ii-b) Under [ = 0; h > 0], we have c = 0 for both long and short term legislator and the respective …rst order conditions become 2l
Under > 0, the marginal cost of legislative e¤ort is the same for long and short term legislators, but the marginal bene…t is higher for the former if
This proposition tells us that the comparison of legislative e¤ort across short and long term legislators is ambiguous in principle. The discounting of more distant rewards (or punishments) discourages e¤ort by legislators enjoying a long term. The role of discounting plays a role similar to the accountability pressure from election proximity highlighted by Barro (1973) . But two other forces may make short term legislators work less hard at legislation: campaign commitments may crowd out legislative e¤ort for short term legislators (a campaigning e¤ect); also short term legislators may be less certain that they will be around to capture the full returns to their legislative e¤ort (a payback horizon e¤ect).
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It is worth discussing two aspects of the payback e¤ect. The …rst is that the short term weakens incentives to exert legislative e¤ort at the margin only if the marginal impact of that e¤ort on the reelection probability is relatively low. This is because there are two forces at play: on the one hand, legislative e¤ort raises the reelection probability, so a short term makes an additional unit of e¤ort a means to capturing the future returns of the inframarginal units, strengthening incentives. On the other hand, when rewards accrue in the future a short term makes them uncertain, weakening incentives. When the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on the probability of reelection is relatively low, the second e¤ect dominates.
The second aspect to highlight is that in the payback parametric scenario [ = 0; h > 0]
short term legislators reduce the e¤ort they put into an activity that is slow to pay. Because campaigning is zero in that scenario, it is not fully apparent that there are incentives 8 In the scenario with both campaigning and payback e¤ects ( = 1; h = 1), the e¤ects reinforce each other, depressing legislative e¤ort. 
, with the former being larger than the latter under the same conditions supporting l L > l S in part ii-b of our last proposition. That means when legislative e¤ort yields returns over multiple periods short term legislators substitute campaigning (a form of e¤ort that pays quickly) for legislation (a form of e¤ort that pays slowly).
This form of the payback e¤ect -obtained in a context of observable e¤ort-resonates with the familiar substitution results in hidden action models of multi-tasking (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole 1999) . In our model the driver is not the precision with which di¤erent types of e¤ort can be observed but the speed with which they pay. Term length alters the relative attractiveness of activities when these have di¤erent payback horizons.
Whether the campaigning or payback e¤ects can, in practice, overcome the accountability e¤ect driven by discounting is an empirical question. The legislators we interviewed deemed plausible both the campaigning and the payback channels.
Discussion
Some of the e¤ects we study have correlates in a literature that has analyzed the e¤ects of pre-set, deterministic, contract length in labor and industrial organization contexts. 9 Cantor (1988) studied optimal contract length in a moral hazard setting where wage revisions are costly. Making contracts too long saves on revision costs, but it makes the reward of a revised wage more remote, weakening the agent's incentives to exert e¤ort. This e¤ect is analogous to the accountability e¤ect driven by discounting. In a later paper, Cantor (1990) analyzed the formation of …rm-speci…c human capital requiring both e¤ort by a trainee and investment by the …rm. During the life of an initial contract, the returns to human capital accrue to the …rm, so longer contracts, by postponing upward wage revision, discourage employee e¤ort.
A shorter contract, however, shortens the time over which the …rm captures returns to its investment. The payback e¤ect isolated in our model is related to the e¤ects that a longer contract would have on the …rm in Cantor's (1990) model.
There are empirical studies examining whether longer contracts might be a way to insure a …rm's investment against hold up -Joskow (1977) showed that longer contracts between coal suppliers and electric utilities were preferred when investments were more speci…c. This suggests that contracts get longer when investment needs more protection. We are unaware of analogous studies in the area of labor economics linking contract length to e¤ort and employee investment. The most relevant studies study the link between longer tenures (an endogenous outcome) with higher productivity ( One di¤erence between our political setting and much of the literature on moral hazard in general, and contract length in particular, is that in our setting output is not contractible, and that reelection rather than money transfers is used as an incentive instrument, introducing career concerns. Another important di¤erence is that in our model e¤ort is observable, abstracting from the incentives vs. insurance trade o¤ and the role of information structures, which play important roles in the literatures on multi-tasking (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) , multi-tasking and career concerns (as in Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole 1999), and in ‡uence activities (e.g., Milgrom 1988).
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3 The natural experiment in the Argentine House of Representatives
Background
Argentina is a federal republic consisting of twenty four legislative districts: twenty three provinces and an autonomous federal district. The National Congress has two chambers, the Chamber of Deputies (i.e., the House of Representatives) and the Senate. The procedure for the random allocation of terms, set by the Comisión de Labor Parlamentaria (the equivalent of the Rules committee in the United States) involved dividing the representatives into two groups of equal size, Group 1 and Group 2. Each party-province delegation apportioned an equal number of its members to each group (see Table 2 ). 11 During a public session on January 20 of 1984, the Secretario Parlamentario performed a lottery draw, which gave legislators in Group 1 a four-year term and legislators in Group 2 a two-year term.
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The party-province delegations did not know which group would get assigned the long term when apportioning legislators to groups 1 and 2. One could be concerned that if delegations systematically assigned the better legislators to one particular group then the 10 For descriptions of the Argentine Congress see Molinelli, Palanza, and Sin (1999) and Jones et al. (2007) . 11 The two representatives from Tierra del Fuego (the smallest district) were allocated to the same group.
In the case that a party had an odd number of representatives from one province the imbalance was corrected with the analogous surplus from another province where the party also had an odd number of representatives. 12 Since the return to democracy in 1983 the two dominant political parties in Argentina have been the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR, or Radical party) and the Partido Justicialista (PJ, or Peronist party). In the period under analysis the majority party was the Unión Cívica Radical.
12 assignment of term lengths would not be e¤ectively exogenous. But behind a veil of ignorance there would be no reason for risk averse legislators to introduce any imbalance, so we do not see this aspect of the design as problematic. Moreover, the majority of party-province delegations (75 percent) did the assignment in a way that was essentially random. They assigned legislators occupying an odd-numbered position in the 1983 electoral party list to one group, and those occupying an even-numbered position to the other. Positions in the ticket (i.e., whether a legislator is close to the top or not) depend largely on the demographics of the province area to which the legislator belongs. A second factor a¤ecting list positions is the perceived popularity of the candidate in her area. Thus, whether a legislator is …rst or tenth in her party list is not random, but whether she falls in an even-or odd-numbered position is. The remaining 25 percent of the delegations did not follow the odd vs. even slot procedure to assign legislators to groups, but by all observable measures their assignment appears random as well. As will be shown, our …ndings are robust to eliminating these delegations from the sample and to clustering standard errors at the party-province level.
As shown in Table 3 , there are no statistically signi…cant di¤erences in observables across the two groups of legislators according to a di¤erence in means test, suggesting that the randomization was successful. 13 We perform two additional balancing tests: (i) A regression of the probability of being assigned to Group 1 or Group 2 on the set of pre-assignment characteristics reveals these characteristics are not signi…cant predictors of assignment (the F statistic p-value is 0.54); (ii) We run a regression of the index of legislative e¤ort on the set of observable characteristics, compute the predicted e¤ort, and then regress predicted e¤ort on a dummy for drawing the long term. We …nd no signi…cant link between term assignment and the part of e¤ort driven by observable characteristics (the coe¢ cient on the long term dummy is not signi…cant; the p-value is equal to 0.14) The results of these tests provide additional assurance that the allocation of terms was random. 13 One may worry that the aggregate data masks systematic unbalancing within parties that cancels out in the aggregate, and that perhaps one imbalanced party spuriously drives results. We ran balancing tests for the two main parties separately and found no pattern of systematic di¤erence. Only one observable is unbalanced for one party (fraction of lawyers for the Partido Justicialista). As we show later, the e¤ect of term length holds for each separate major party. To complement our understanding of the functioning of the Argentine Congress, we interviewed six legislators identi…ed in our acknowledgements. These individuals were identi…ed through personal contacts and in no way constitute a representative sample. 14 However, their opinions were highly consensual and we believe it is of interest to share them.
The legislators we interviewed believe the metrics we obtained capture di¤erent types of legislative e¤ort. They valued the diversity of measures because legislators cultivate di¤erent pro…les. Some legislators may seek to capture the attention of constituents by introducing a high number of bills. Others may care more strongly about policy, so they may introduce fewer bills but focus more on approval or on committee work. Floor attendance will re ‡ect general involvement with the daily legislative business. 15 Table 4 shows the correlation matrix of the measures we use. Several correlations are weak and in some cases negative. In light of this and the feedback from legislators, we believe the metrics we use, while noisy, do 14 We followed a predetermined interview plan. We …rst asked them their opinion on the e¤ort metrics made available by Congress. Later we discussed the issue of term length. In order not to bias their feedback, we reminded them of the randomization of term lengths and waited for their spontaneous analysis of the intervening mechanisms and consequences. 15 To illustrate how attendance may capture forms of involvement, consider the case of César Jaroslavsky (UCR, Province of Entre Ríos), who was not involved in speci…c committee work nor introduced many bills of his own, but who played a central political role as majority leader. He was present in over 94% of all ‡oor sessions, placing second in the attendance ranking.
proxy for di¤erent and relevant dimensions of legislative e¤ort. One indication of relevance is that these metrics are signi…cant predictors of reelection.
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In order to draw general conclusions in a context of multiple outcomes, we construct an index of legislative e¤ort that aggregates the six measures described above. The index is the equally weighted average of z-scores of its components (see Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007) .
The z-scores are levels standardized using the mean and standard deviation for the two-year legislators. In all cases higher e¤ort measures have higher z-scores.
The variable of interest is Four-year term, an indicator variable equal to one for legislators assigned to an initial four-year term and zero otherwise. Our data includes various legislator characteristics, such as age (as of November 1983), the distance in kilometers from the capital of the legislator's province to Buenos Aires, and a series of dummy variables equal to one when the legislator: is male, is a lawyer, is a …rst time national legislator, holds a university degree, occupies a leadership position (i.e., president of the chamber, chair of a committee, and majority or minority leader), belongs to the majority party, and belongs to a small block (i.e., less than four legislators).
Representatives in Argentina are elected through a closed party list at the province level.
Under this system, the degree of electoral safety depends on how high up in the party ticket a legislator …nds herself. For example, in 1983 the UCR had 19 candidates running for the seats corresponding to the province of Santa Fe. But given the party's vote share and the proportional representation system, only the top ten members were seated. Those legislators close to the tenth position in the ticket faced risk going forward, given that the party's electoral strength might erode, and that the legislator's ranking in a future party list depends largely on relatively permanent factors, such as the demographics of the legislator's home area. We develop a dummy variable (Slackness) to capture electoral safety. We say a legislator is safe if she entered Congress within the top half of her party-province delegation 16 We investigated probit regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the legislator is reelected, and the e¤ort metrics are the main independent variables. Our preferred speci…cation has the e¤ort index (with collapsed data by legislator) as the main independent variable. The linear term of the index is strongly signi…cant across all speci…cations we tried, and the quadratic term is not signi…cant, suggesting that reelection is a roughly linear function of e¤ort.
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(in our example, in the top …ve slots), in which case Slackness is equal to one. We say she is relatively at risk otherwise, in which case Slackness is equal to zero (Slackness is a signi…cant predictor of reelection).
Econometric model and results
Given random assignment, the causal e¤ect of assignment to an initial four-year term relative to serving an initial two-year term can be estimated by using the following regression model:
where Y it is any of the e¤ort measures under study for legislator i in period t (where t = 1984; 1985, the two years following the assignment), is the parameter of interest, X i is a matrix of time-invariant legislator characteristics, t is a year …xed e¤ect, and " it is the error term. Table 5 reports estimates of when the dependent variable is the index of legislative e¤ort. 17 Results with and without controls indicate that legislators serving a four-year term work harder than those serving a two-year term and that the di¤erence is statistically signi…cant. The size of the estimated e¤ect is a third of a standard deviation of the e¤ort distribution. The size of the e¤ect appears considerable relative to the e¤ects of observable characteristics. For instance, the e¤ort di¤erence between the long and short term legislators is more than one and a half times the e¤ect of a university degree, almost one and a half times the impact of being a legislative leader, and roughly the same as the e¤ect of being in the majority party. This underscores the strength of the term length e¤ect.
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To determine whether the e¤ects are wide-ranging or concentrated in just one or two outcomes, we estimate and report in Table 6 the e¤ects on each separate e¤ort metric.
The e¤ect of term length appears quite general: the point estimates are positive for all six 17 A typical concern when conducting inference for the estimated parameters of Equation 1 is that the errors for the same legislator might not be independent. To address this concern we cluster standard errors at the legislator level, and we later report a speci…cation using data collapsed by legislator. 18 For example, belonging to the majority party has been estimated to play a sizeable role in legislative e¤ectiveness by Padro-i-Miquel and Snyder (2006) . metrics and statistically signi…cant for four of the six. 19 20 Figure 1 shows box-and-whiskers plots comparing the two groups on each measure of e¤ort, which gives a view of the whole distribution of e¤ects.
The di¤erences in e¤ort tend to be important in size. Focusing on mean e¤ects in the controlled regressions, we see from Table 6 that getting a longer term signi…cantly increases ‡oor attendance by 3 percent (relative to the mean of the two-year legislators). This is a nontrivial e¤ect; as a point of comparison, Lott (1987) estimated a 6 percent decrease in voting frequency for retiring legislators. Committee attendance is about 12 percent higher for long term legislators, and the number of committee bills bearing the legislator's signature goes up by 19 percent. Lastly, ‡oor speaking appears to respond by 13 percent to a longer term although this result is not signi…cant.
The idea that longer terms increase e¤ort also appears to be backed by the measures of "bill production." The point estimate in column (10) in Table 6 indicates that the number of bills introduced goes up by 20 percent. This estimate, however, loses signi…cance when clustering the standard errors. When we switch attention from the "volume" measure of bill production to the "legislative e¢ cacy" measure, namely the number of bills that pass, the estimates become strongly signi…cant. The point estimate (see column (12) in Table   6 ) indicates that moving from a two to a four-year term almost doubles the number of bills passed. 21 Ferraz and Finan (2008) …nd a 22 percent increase in bills approved when Brazilian local legislators receive wages that are 20 percent higher. Thus, the productivity e¤ect of a two-year term extension is comparable in magnitude to the e¤ect of substantial 19 The variables committee bills, ‡oor speeches, bills introduced, and bills rati…ed take discrete values and are strongly skewed to the right with many observations at zero; thus, ordinary least squares estimation would be inappropriate. For all of these variables we were able to reject the hypothesis that the dispersion parameter is equal to zero according to a likelihood-ratio test, which suggests that the correct speci…cation is a negative binomial model for count data as adopted here. 20 One may conjecture that the years 3 and 4 of four year legislators are similar to the years 1 and 2 of the two year legislators, so the former should display lower e¤ort in their last two years. This conjecture is true (results available upon request), although one must keep in mind the result could be driven by time e¤ects. 21 We explore an alternative de…nition of bill production that considers not only the bills a legislator introduced but also those that she endorsed and obtain similar results.
wage increases. Overall, our results indicate a strong tendency for longer terms to increase legislative e¤ort.
Robustness checks
To further address the issue that observations are not independently drawn, we collapse the observations by legislator and then cluster the standard errors at the province level. As reported in columns (1) to (7) in Table 7 , our conclusions remain unchanged. In column (8) in Table 7 we show estimates of the principal component (which accounts for 32 percent of the total variance). Again, the estimated coe¢ cient of the long term dummy variable is positive and signi…cant at the one percent level.
In Table 8 we report additional estimations under a wide range of alternative speci…ca-tions and samples. First, the signi…cance of the term length variable is not a¤ected when we cluster standard errors at the province level, or according to party-province combinations. Second, our conclusions remain unchanged when we restrict the sample to those party-province delegations that used the even/odd rule to assign legislators into the two groups, and when, in addition, we also exclude the …rst two legislators in the party list (we take this extra step because the di¤erence between occupying an even vs. odd position is generally random but one could argue this may not apply to the top two positions in the party list). Third, we run separate regressions for the two main parties in order to explore possible heterogeneity in the e¤ect of term lengths according to political party. Despite the smaller sample size, we still …nd a positive and signi…cant association between term length and legislative e¤ort for legislators of both parties. While the point estimate is larger for Peronists, the di¤erence between the two estimates is not statistically signi…cant. Finally, the value and signi…cance of the coe¢ cient of interest remains unchanged when we exclude from the sample legislators that were leaders or those few who changed leader status during the sample period.
22 22 We experimented with di¤erent de…nitions of leaderhip and always found similar results.
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Potential concerns
Even when our study relies on a well documented randomization, one can still harbor some potential concerns regarding the exogeneity and nature of the treatment. First, it could be the case that re-optimizations took place after the random assignment that might have a¤ected e¤ort for reasons other than the change in term length. For example, legislators given a four-year term could have obtained better committee assignments. Thus, in the presence of hierarchical re-optimization the conclusion that lengthening terms is a good idea would not follow if such extension were to bene…t all legislators. Our experiment is quite unique in that it is well documented that all committee assignments, leadership positions, and placement along the internal hierarchy of the chamber were decided before the assignment of terms was done. Very few re-allocations are observed after the random assignment, and they appear unrelated to term length. 23 The results remain unchanged when we exclude from the sample those legislators that changed status as chamber leaders or moved in or out of the most important committees (see the last column in Table 8 ).
A second story is one where parties may direct opportunities and responsibilities to the long term legislators, discriminating against the others. This story also posits that collective arrangements may confound (even replace) the role of individual incentives, and that the e¤ects of the treatment are not unrelated to the relative size of the treated group.
Such collective arrangements might be especially prevalent in a proportional representation system. While our data do not allow a direct test for such possibility, several observations are due. One, the main way in which such a centralized process could work is by means of a¤ecting positions in the internal hierarchy of the House, which as discussed above, was set before terms were assigned. Two, there is a strong indication that there is a link between individual incentives, individual actions, and individual career outcomes, as individual e¤ort 19 is a signi…cant predictor of reelection. 24 Three, if long term legislators enjoyed advantages that make them more powerful or well known, they should enjoy higher reelection chances conditional on e¤ort. However, after controlling for e¤ort the long term legislators do not enjoy higher reelection rates (a caveat on this result is that di¤erences in reelection rates are a¤ected by time e¤ects). Four, we will show below that the data matches further predictions of our model driven by an individual logic that is independent of collective arrangements or the treatment status of others. Five, our interviews failed to substantiate the notion that such centralized processes play a role in the Argentine Congress. The view of legislators is that e¤ort choices are essentially an individual decision.
The view of legislators is of interest given Argentina's proportional representation system.
There are additional reasons why we believe the results are not dependent on the proportional representation aspect. One is covered in the following section, where we study evidence from the Senate, where races are much closer to uninominal. The other is that we would expect proportional representation features to be stronger in larger province delegations, where individual politicians are less well known and potentially more dependent on the party. However, having experimented with various caps on delegation size, we have found the e¤ects to be independent of delegation size.
A third, and perhaps more important, threat to the interpretation of the e¤ects is that the outcome of the lottery may directly a¤ect the morale of legislators, boosting the spirits of those who got a four-year term, and depressing the rest. In this case, the instrument would not be a¤ecting behavior through its e¤ect on term length, but directly through its "win" or "loss" meaning. According to the literature in experimental psychology (see for instance Amsel 1992), an implication of the "altered morale" hypothesis is that we should observe the e¤ort of legislators given two-year terms lagging in the early months, then quickly 24 As stated before, the e¤ort index is a signi…cant regressor in the reelection probit. In a speci…cation with controls, the coe¢ cient is 0.44 (p-value 0.017), which translates into a marginal e¤ect of 0.14. A move from 0 to 1 in the e¤ort index buys 14 percentage points in reelection probability. The mean di¤erence between long-and short-term legislators is 0.2, so the term length e¤ect is roughly an increase of 2.8 percentage points in the reelection probability. Although not a large e¤ect, this is not trivial when considering the low baseline reelection probabilities in Argentina.
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recovering as spirits revert to normal. As shown later in column 1 of Table 11 , the strength of the e¤ects is statistically indistinguishable across the two sample years. In addition, in our working paper (Dal Bó and Rossi 2008) we examine the e¤ort di¤erential across groups on a monthly basis and cannot support the idea that four-year legislators do better only in the …rst few months. This suggests an e¤ect linked to incentives rather than to the lottery having a¤ected morale.
Data and additional evidence from the Senate
As a result of a constitutional reform in 1994, the whole Senate needed to be renewed in 2001, when the body's 71 senators were elected at the same time to start their terms on December
10
. 25 The modi…cation of term lengths and renewal rates required that some senators be assigned two-year terms, others four-year terms, and others six-year terms. The allocation was done through a well documented random assignment during a public legislative session on December 12 of 2001. All three senators from each province were jointly and randomly placed on a two-, four-, or six-year track. One implication of this design is that we cannot use province dummies, although we can control for distance.
Examining the Senate episode is important for external validity reasons. It allows us to focus on a di¤erent chamber at a di¤erent historical juncture. Moreover, the Senate o¤ers a setting where the idiosyncracies of the party-list cum proportional representation system are more diluted. There are only three senators per province; they are highly notorious and represent the entire province. The majority party obtains two seats and the minority the third seat. The notoriety factor together with the extremely short list make senatorial races almost identical to those in a uninominal system.
In keeping with the House experiment where the short term legislators had a two-year track, we will begin by comparing senators in the two-year track against the rest; accordingly, we will de…ne the Long term variable as a dummy equal to 1 if the senator got a four-or six-year term, and zero otherwise. Thus the sample includes 130 observations corresponding to 65 legislators for two years.
Again, in order to draw general conclusions in a context of multiple outcomes we use an index of legislative e¤ort. In column (1) in Table 10 we show results showing e¤ects that are about a third larger than those in the House. 26 Columns (3) and (4) show a similar picture when the data are collapsed at the legislator level; the model reported in column (4) has as dependent variable the …rst principal component of the individual e¤ort measures (which accounts for 57 percent of the variance). When we include a full set of controls the point estimates from these speci…cations remain broadly unchanged but with our sample size they lose signi…cance, as exempli…ed in column (2). Delving into the individual metrics of e¤ort (columns (5)- (7)), we …nd that the change caused by a longer term over the mean e¤ort of the two-year senators is of 2 percent for ‡oor attendance (an e¤ect similar to that in the House), 49 percent for the number of bills introduced, and 27 percent for the number of bills passed.
As shown in Table 10 , only one of theses di¤erences is signi…cant. However, the di¤erences in all three metrics go in favor of the long term legislators, which is informative. The e¤ect 26 When we consider three treatments categories (two, four, and six year terms) we …nd that the point estimate of being assigned to a four year term is positive but smaller than the one associated to being assigned to a six year term. In other words, e¤ects appear to get stronger the longer the term assigned. We return to the comparison between four and six year senators later.
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on bills introduced is statistically signi…cant and its magnitude is large. To provide an idea of the potential money value of the e¤ect, note that Ferraz and Finan (2008) estimate that a 20 percent wage raise for local legislators in Brazil increases bills submitted by 25 percent.
The e¤ect of extending terms for senators in Argentina appears to be twice that of a 20 percent increase in wages in Brazil.
Overall, the picture from the Senate corroborates the one we obtained from the House.
6 Investigating mechanisms
Campaigning and payback
Legislators with longer terms appear on average to exert more e¤ort both in the House and the Senate. According to our model in Section 2 that e¤ect could arise under two very di¤erent parametric scenarios. In one, campaigning may keep short term legislators busier (in terms of the model, = 1) and in the other legislative e¤ort may take time to yield returns (in terms of the model, h = 1). To investigate whether these forces could be at play, in this section we rely further on our model and our data.
Test 1 -Campaigning vs payback -Senate
A straightforward test is possible in the context of the Senate. We can compare four-vs six-year senators during their …rst two years in o¢ ce, when none of them are campaigning.
In terms of the model, that amounts to = 0. It follows from Proposition 1 that i) If campaigning is solely responsible for the e¤ects identi…ed in sections 4 and 5, then the six-year senators should not work harder than four-year senators, and ii) For the six-year senators to work harder than the four-year ones, it is necessary that the payback channel be present, i.e., that h = 1.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 11 report estimates obtained by excluding from the sample all senators in the two-year track. The Long term variable is now equal to 1 for six-year senators and zero for the four-year senators. The results favor the view that six-year legislators exert more e¤ort than four-year legislators during the …rst two years of their terms.
This suggests that it is not just campaigning distractions but a concern with payback that 23 induces long term legislators to work harder.
Test 2 -Campaigning vs payback -House
The preceding test is not feasible in the House given the lack of six-year terms. But a related test is feasible if we exploit the intra-term variation. If campaigns crowd out legislative e¤ort during the months immediately preceding the election, it should be true that the e¤ort di¤erences between representatives arise mainly in the second of the two sample years. Thus, an interaction term between the Long Term variable and a dummy for the second year should be positive and signi…cant. Column (3) in Table 11 report estimates of the e¤ect of the long term assignment and the interaction e¤ect in the House. We fail to …nd evidence that the e¤ort di¤erential in favor of the long term legislators is driven by, or widens in, the second year. 27 This again speaks against the campaigning story and in favor of the payback hypothesis.
Test 3 -Campaigning -House
We now explore the campaigning hypothesis in the House in an alternative way. The legislators we interviewed indicated that campaigning commitments arrive as the election nears; they also told us that campaigning, which requires presence in the legislator's home turf within the province, poses a larger con ‡ict with legislative e¤ort for those representing geographically remote provinces. Thus, according to the legislators we interviewed, if campaigning distractions drive the e¤ect of term length this e¤ect should be stronger among representatives from more distant provinces.
We can use our model to study the e¤ect of increases in distance on the e¤ects of a longer term. We consider the model under the parametric scenario [ = 1; h = 0] where campaigning drives results and study the comparative statics of on l S and l L .
Proposition 2 In the scenario where campaigning drives term length e¤ects ( = 1; h = 0) the e¤ect of a longer term on legislative e¤ort (i.e., the di¤erence l L l S ) is increasing in geographic distance .
27 When the sample is restricted to the …rst year of the term, the estimated coe¢ cient for Long Term is 0.227 with a standard error of 0.069 (statistically signi…cant at the one percent level and equivalent to that obtained in the unrestricted sample).
Proof: See Appendix.
According to this proposition, if campaigning drives term length e¤ects the coe¢ cient of the interaction between the Long term dummy and distance should be positive. As reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table 11 , the coe¢ cient of that interaction has the wrong sign and is not signi…cant (p-values of 0:57 and 0:50, respectively). We again fail to …nd support for the campaigning hypothesis in the House. This does not imply we can completely rule out the campaigning hypothesis. Given the coe¢ cient and the standard error reported in columns (4) and (5) it is conceivable that an e¤ect at the top of the con…dence interval would yield some campaigning-driven e¤ects. But it is still noteworthy that three di¤erent implications of the campaigning hypothesis, one in the Senate and two in the House, fail to meet support in the data.
It seems prima facie counter-intuitive that campaigning, being a time demanding activity, would not appear to di¤erentially damage the short term legislators. One possibility is that campaigning does not really pose a stronger con ‡ict with legislation for those representing more remote districts-so the distance-based test is misguided. But the legislators we interviewed appear to be right that campaigning is costlier for representatives from remote provinces. 28 Another possibility is that, as pointed out by the legislators we interviewed, campaigning in Argentina is to a great extent a team e¤ort at the party level. Legislators that are not running for o¢ ce often campaign alongside those who are, which in the language of our model would yield = 0.
Test 4 -Payback Horizon -House
We now investigate the presence of the payback e¤ect in an additional way by looking at variation in the measure of electoral safety , under the null = 0 which we have been unable to reject. We then focus on the payback scenario (where [ = 0; h > 0]), and study the 28 For example, ‡oor attendance, to take a metric directly related to physical location, diminishes more in the second year for legislators from remote districts (e.g., 1,500 kilometers away), indicating campaigning takes a statistically detectable toll. But belonging to those more remote districts does not signi…cantly a¤ect the size of the term length e¤ect on ‡oor attendance, suggesting that the term length e¤ect is not driven by campaigning. We thank a referee for suggesting this check.
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comparative statics of the electoral shifter on the two groups of legislators. Comparative statics e¤ects involve both direct and indirect e¤ects, and the exact magnitude of the latter depend on curvature features. So for this exercise we impose an additional assumption, namely that the function P (l; ) not be too concave in l. 29 We can now state,
Proposition 3
Under the scenario where the payback horizon drives term length e¤ects ( = 0 and h = 1), and under our assumptions on the function P (l; ), the e¤ect of a longer term on legislative e¤ort (i.e., the di¤erence l L l S ) is decreasing in electoral safety .
This proposition captures the intuition that if the payback horizon hypothesis is true legislators who are electorally safer should care less about term length than those at risk.
In the extreme case of someone whose reelection is guaranteed, term length does not a¤ect the expected time in o¢ ce. Thus, a two-and a four-year term yield the same expectation of capturing the returns to e¤ort investments. In the other extreme of someone who is certain not to be reelected, the term length extension does a¤ect dramatically the expectation of payback from partial to complete. Thus, if the payback horizon channel drives our main …ndings, an interaction variable between being safer and getting the longer term should be negative.
The variable capturing electoral safety, "Slackness," was introduced in Section 3. In columns (6) and (7) of Table 11 we report results indicating that the interaction of the Long term variable and the electoral safety measure for House members is indeed negative and statistically signi…cant. In other words, the e¤ects of term length are stronger among "at risk" legislators. Moving from the bottom half to the top half of one's party-province delegation undoes two thirds of the e¤ect of being dealt a longer term. These results suggest that the payback horizon plays a role in the term length e¤ects found in the House, and that legislative e¤ort embodies an investment. This further backs the view that the e¤ects of term length are driven an individual calculus rather than by collective arrangements.
We believe the investment logic is plausible given the time structure of legislative activity.
The mean time lag since the introduction of a bill to its approval was, in our sample period, of 327 days, even abstracting from the time spent preparing the bill. Also, a legislator will often have to decide whether to spend time absorbing information that will be useful while a policy issue remains current, which may be a few years. 30 Alternatively, a legislator may buy an apartment close to the legislature in order to lower her future costs of attending meetings, or shut down her private law …rm to more fully focus her time and attention on legislation. These costs are slow to amortize and legislators with shorter terms may decide not to incur them. In addition, a change from a two-to a four-year term should signi…cantly a¤ect the e¤ective payback horizon facing Argentine legislators: reelection rates in Argentina have been traditionally low (around 25 percent for our sample). 31 An important caveat is due: the maintained assumption in this exercise is that the slackness variable is exogenously driven by demographic characteristics of the part of a province from which a legislator originates. Although legislators maintain such demographics are an important exogenous determinant of list placement, legislators in di¤erent parts of the party-province list are not necessarily comparable, so identi…cation in this exercise is less reliable than in our main results.
Does experience matter?
Lastly, we inquire about the nature of the potential investments involved in legislative activity. This is useful from the perspective of the optimal design of terms. One possibility is that investments, once accumulated, render legislators unresponsive to term lengths. This would be the case for instance if longer terms a¤ected e¤ort because they foster learning by doing about general legislative aspects that do not depreciate. Another possibility is that 30 As one legislator put it to us (our translation from Spanish), "The library of Congress is vast...you can do a 'doctorate' in here, as some of the committees deal with really complex issues. Obviously, if you are going to be around for longer, you get into it more..." 31 The average reelection rate for the 1983-2001 period was 20 percent (see Jones et al. 2002) 
Conclusion
Term length is a fundamental aspect of constitutional design. To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst investigation that relies on natural experiments to study how term length a¤ects the e¤ort of politicians. We frame our empirical investigation with a theoretical model highlighting competing forces. On the one hand, longer terms push the reward of reelection farther into the future (a weakened accountability e¤ect). On the other hand, longer terms may free legislators from campaigning, as well as increase the chance that they will be around to bene…t from their past legislative involvement (the campaigning and payback e¤ects, respectively). Results from two natural experiments in the Argentine House and Senate, where the length of terms was randomized, suggest that the accountability e¤ect is dominated by one or both of the campaigning and payback e¤ects.
In this paper we take steps not just to investigate whether term lengths matter and in which direction, but also to gain insight on why they matter. To this end we perform a series of tests. We do not expect a single exercise to pin down interpretation, but taken together the results indicate that the e¤ects of term length are unlikely to stem from campaigning crowding out legislative e¤ort. Instead, our data support the idea that the payback horizon matters to legislators. In the context we study incentives seem to be strengthened by job stability, which our model predicts can happen when e¤ort embodies an investment that yields its return over multiple periods.
The issue of term lengths, and more generally the bene…ts of job stability, is relevant not only to public o¢ ce but also to the private sector, where both incentives and the accumulation of …rm-speci…c human capital are important. Surprisingly, there is a dearth of empirical work at the micro level that can neatly identify the e¤ects of a guaranteed longer tenure on employee incentives, presumably due to the identi…cation di¢ culties that have hindered analogous studies in politics to date. We hope that our approach can provide a blueprint for studies extending attention to other political settings and labor relations more generally.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: Note the …rst order conditions for the long term legislator are invariant in , so we only need to show that
Di¤erentiating the …rst order conditions of the short term legislator with respect to , while considering l S and c S as implicit functions of , and then solving for
we get
2 < 0, where the sign follows from the denominator being positive from P cc 0; P lc 0 and from the second order conditions.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Di¤erentiating the …rst order conditions for the legislative e¤ort of short and long term legislators with respect to , considering l S and l L as implicit functions of (and using the assumption P l = 0), we obtain,
The signs follow from the assumptions on P (:) , the second order conditions, and the (easy to demonstrate) fact that dV d > 0. A comparison of numerators shows that the increase in l S is larger due to a direct e¤ect that is larger by P h (this term captures the marginal e¤ect of electoral safety higher expectation that electorally safer legislators have of capturing the future returns to e¤ort), unless the denominator drives the result. For this not to happen it su¢ ces that Capital  25  7  3  -1  1  ----12  7  4  1  1  ----13  Buenos Aires  70  18  16  1  ------35  19  15  1  -----35  Catamarca  5  1 The long track corresponds to a four year term. The short track corresponds to a two year term. Leader is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the legislator is the president of the chamber, a majority or minority leader, or a committee chair. Freshman is a dummy equal to 1 for Representatives without any previous legislative experience at the national level. Slackness is a dummy equal to 1 if, given the party-province list in the 1983 elections, the legislator placed in the top half of the elected delegation. Small block is a dummy equal to 1 when the legislator belongs to a party holding three or fewer seats. Distance is the distance (in hundreds of kilometers) from the capital of the legislator's province to Buenos Aires (the seat of the national legislature). The number of observations is 492. *Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level, based on a t-test of equality of means. Controls include Age, Male, Freshman, Lawyer, University degree, Leader, Slackness, Majority party, Small block, and the set of province dummies. The number of observations is 492. *Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level. (3)-(8). Regression (3) includes only those party-province delegations that used the even/odd rule in order to assign legislators into the two groups, whereas regression (4) also excludes the first two legislators in the party list. Regression (5) includes only majority party (Unión Cívica Radical) legislators, whereas regression (6) includes only minority party (Partido Justicialista) legislators. Regression (7) excludes legislators that are leaders, and regression (8) excludes those legislators that change leader status during the sample period. All models include a time dummy and are estimated by OLS. Controls include Age, Male, Freshman, Lawyer, University degree, Leader, Slackness, Majority party, Small block, and the set of province dummies. **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level. Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The long track corresponds to four and six year terms. The short track corresponds to a two year term. Leader is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the legislator is the president of the chamber, a majority or minority leader, or a committee chair. Freshman is a dummy equal to 1 for Representatives without any previous legislative experience at the national level. Small block is a dummy equal to 1 when the legislator belongs to a party holding three or fewer seats. Distance is the distance (in hundreds of kilometers) from the capital of the legislator's province to Buenos Aires (the seat of the national legislature). The number of observations is 130. **Significant at the 5% level, based on a ttest on equality of means. Standard errors clustered at the legislator level are in braces (for collapsed data these are equivalent to robust standard errors). The principal component accounts for 57 percent of the total variance. For OLS models, Change is calculated as 100*Estimate/mean of the respective output for legislators in a short track. For Negbin (Negative Binomial) models, Change is calculated as 100*[exp(Estimate)-1]. Change is not calculated for the Index since this variable is normalized to zero for legislators in a short track. All specifications include a time dummy. In models (3) and (4) the data are collapsed at the legislator level. Controls include Age, Male, Freshman, Lawyer, University degree, Leader, Majority party, Small block, and Distance. *Significant at the 10% level; ***Significant at the 10% level.
